Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1973

First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. As Administrator of the EStates
of George Hatton Buckley And Pearl Murdock Buckley v. Lucile
Buckley Hall And Harold E. Hall : Petition For Rehearing And Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Frank J. Allen; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, First Security Bank v. Hall, No. 12837 (1973).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5631

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
T SECURITY BANK OF

)
)
e Estates of GEORGE HATTON )
)
KLEY and PEARL MURDOCK
LEY,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
)
)
LE BUCKLEY HALL, and
)
LD E. HALL,
)
)
Defendants and Appellants.
)

H, N. A. , as Administrator

PETITION FOR REHEARING
BRIEF

A.-1

FRANK J ... ·.
CLYDE,·
351 South
Salt La.ke
Attorney

f0•:

J, ELLIS, ESQ.
cipal Building
, Utah 84601
rney for Respondent

1 .,, '

·

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PETITION FOR REHEARING . . . . . . . . . . .

1

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION. . . . . .

4

POINT I:
THE COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE
ESTATE OF GEORGE HATTON
BUCKLEY BY CONCERTED
ACTION OF HIS HEIRS.. . . . . . . . .

4

POINT II:
THE COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT FOUND THE EVIDENCE
INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW A
DE FACTO DISTRIBUTION......

7

POINT III:
THIS COURT ERRED IN ITS
FAILURE TO RULE THAT THE
ESTATE'S PROPER ACTION,
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES,
WAS AGAINST THE MERCUR DOME
GOLD MINING COMPANY, THE
ISSUER OF THE STOCK WHICH
WAS THE SUBJECT OF THIS
LITIGATION, FOR REPLACEMENT
OF SHARES WRONGFULLY
TRANSFERRED ................. 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH, N. A. , as Administrator
of the Estates of George Hatton
Buckley and Pearl Murdock
Buckley,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs LUCILE BUCKLEY HALL, and
HAROLD E. HALL,
Defendants and Appellants.

)
)

)

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
12837

)
)

)

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF

When this matter was presented on appeal,
there were three distinct legal issues.

The first

related to the kind of proof of intervivos gift
Appellant was obliged to adduce and whether (even
if a "clear and convincing" standard was properly

applied) Appellant's proof was adequate.

The

decision demonstrates that this Court fully

considered and unequivocally ruled on that issu1
A litigant can ask no more.
Appellant's distress derives from the
Court's off-hand treatrn.ent of the remaining,
equally dispositive issues raised by the briefs.
Appellant petitions for rehearing on the followin
grounds:
1.

This Gmrt erred in failing to
recognize a de facto distribution
of the Estate of George Buckley
by concerted action of his heirs.

2.

This Court erred in holding that
''the Court below found the evidence
was insufficient to show that Pearl
Murdock Buckley received the
shares as a part of that de facto
distribution. 11

3.

This Court erred in its failure to
rule that the estate 1 s proper action,
under the circumstances, was
against the Me rcur Dome Gold Minir
Company, the issuer of the stock .
which was the subject of this litigat11
for replacement of shares wrongful!'
transferred.
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Respectfully submitted this 30th day of
January, 1973.
FRANK J. ALLEN
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
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BRIEF IN .SlJ:?POR T OF
POINT I
THIS COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE A DE FACTO
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE
OF GEORGE HATTON BUCKLEY
BY CONCERTED ACTION OF HIS
HEIRS
This Court disposed of the de facto dis-

l
I

tribution issue by erroneously asserting that
the trial court had found there had not been a
de facto distribution.

If the trial court had

indeed made such a finding, it would be
incumbent on this Court to reverse the finding.
The evidence that the heirs got together and
divided up George Buckley's property after
his death is not just clear and convincing, and
it is not just uncontroverted; the fact of

I
I

distribution was the subject of stipulation i!:_
open court.

The relevant quotation from the

j

i

transcript is the following from pages 148and

1

149:

1
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"Q (By Mr. Morgan) Who handled
the distribution of your father's estate?

MR. ELLIS: We object to this
line of questioning, your Honor. It's
completely immaterial.
THE COURT: I believe it is, Mr.
Morgan. What do you claim by it?
MR. MORGAN: Just that they
'(the heirs)' had a distribution of the
estate without probating it by a
judicial proceeding.
THE COURT: I think Mr. Ellis
will stipulate to that, that it was divided
up.
MR. ELLIS: That there was no
formal probate. Yes, we would so
stipulate."
Based on this stipulation, the trial court excluded
any testimony about the specific participation of
the heirs in the procedures of dividing up George
Buckley's property.

So far as the trial court was

concerned, the heirs did divide and intend to effect
a final distribution of George Buckley's estate.

If the trial court found otherwise in the face of:
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1.

The C!llOted stipulation. and

2.

the uncontroverted evidence that
Bert got the car (T-148), Gerald
got the ring (T-148), and each
of the children got $150. 00 (T-157),

then this Court has an obligation to reverse that
finding unless it now rejects the fundamental
principle that findings should be based on evided
It is particularly absurd to assume that

the heirs ignored the stock in dividing up the
estate.

Throughout the trial, the living heirs

referred to the stock as George Buckley's mos:
valuable asset.

On the one occasion in 1947

when Gerald Buckley visited his

father, the

stock's value was, according to Gerald, the
principal subject of discussion (T-190).
Each of George Buckley's heirs living
at the time this suit was commenced admitted I
in deposition or in the course of trial that the
stock belonged to their mother after their fatnil
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death.

Gerald (as the dissenting opinion points

out) testified that the stock was "mom's stock".
Bert admitted that the "probate 11 was

11

just ·

handled among the heirs 11 (deposition of Bert
Buckley, p. 18) and that the stock was in his
t)

mother's possession because "it was just left
to her" (deposition, p. 6).
We submit that, on the evidence, this
Court erred in failing to recognize an effective
distribution by agreement of the heirs.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT FOUND
THE EVIDENCE INSUFFIGENT
TO SHOW A DE FACTO DISTRIBUTION
The trial court made no definitive findings
and adopted no clear conclusions with regard to the
effect of his heirs 1 distribution among themselves of George Buckley 1 s property after his
death.

In fact, the trial court very obviously

proceeded on a firm conviction that such action
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by heirs could not have legal effect.

It is incor;

cei vable that the trial court could have found
that the heirs did not attempt to effect a distri.!

i

bution.

The Court itself called for and got a

I

stipulation that the heirs made such an attempt,
and thereafter the Court refused to hear
evidence on the nature or details of the attempt.
Despite the allegation in the Complaint
that the "stock certificates were 'not' disposed

II

I

of by informal agreement among the heirs",
the trial court made no finding as to the truth
of that allegation because it considered the
allegation immaterial.

What the trial court

did find (Finding Number 4) was that "no probate!
of the Estate of George Hatton Buckley has
heretofore been made and" therefore (our

insertion) "no distribution of the . . . certificate;
. . . has ever been made."

-8-

As argued in Point I hereof, this Court
could not properly permit a finding that no de
facto distribution was undertaken.

What is

particularly disturbing, however, is that this
Court should dispose of the entire set of de
facto distribution issues by the bold assertion
that the trial court made a finding it in fact
neither made nor could have made.

What is

the effect of a division of a deceased's property
among his heirs by their agreement?

Can the

division be disturbed after more than a decade
and in the absence of creditor claims by any heir
who has dissipated his share?

These are facets

of the law as to which this Court has offered no
teaching.

The issues are squarely presented by

this case, and they should not be avoided.
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POINT III
THIS COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE
TO RULE THAT THE ESTATE'S
PROPER ACTION, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS AGAINST THE
MERCUR DOME GOLD MINING COMPANY, THE ISSUER OF THE STOCK
WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF THIS
LITIGATION, FOR REPLACEMENT
I
I
OF SHARES WRONGFULLY TRANSFERRr
One is sue raised by the brief which this I
i

Court completely ignored relates to the nature oi
the relief which the Courts should afford in a cao
such as this.

At the time this action was comme

and at the time the administrator was appointed,
there was no stock outstanding in the name of
George Hatton Buckley.

The stock had been

transferred on the issuer's records to Lucile
Buckley Hall and her purchasers.
legal owners.

They were

If the issuer had improperly tran:I

ferred the shares, then the estate had a cause c:I
action against the issuer.
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So well recognizedi'

I

the obligation of an issuer to replace shares
improperly transferred that issuers routinely
require bonds from applicants for transfer who
cannot produce the endorsement of the record
owner.

Mercur Dome Gold Mining Company

required a bond in this case, and Gerald Buckley
was one of the guarantors.
The real plaintiffs in this case were
Gerald and Bert Buckley.

The decision in this

case gives people in their position (people who
agree to a property division and are later
motivated to recant) options which are hardly
justifiable on equitable principles.

They can

permit securities to be transferred and sold
by a "de facto distributee" who honestly believes

he owns them.

In this case, Gerald actually

induced Lucile to do so.

They then wait, as

Bert and Gerald did here, until the securities
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appreciate or depreciate.

If the securities

appreciate, action is brought against the issuer
to replace the securities.

If the securities

depreciate, action is brought against the
distributee to disgorge the price even though
the tax on it may already have been paid.
We submit that the only remedy whichs
be afforded the plaintiff in this case is recoven
of the improperly transferred stock.

This is

I
I

exactly what the estate would have been requiri
to hold for distribution if the certificates had
never been transferred.

CONCLUSION
The arguments here stated relate to
issues raised by the briefs.

We believe these

I
I

issues deserve more complete and careful
consideration than the decision reflects.

In

addition, although Appellant did not previously I
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raise the issue, we urge, as a basis for reconsideration, that the procedures of Appellant's
appointment.were fatally defective for the
reasons stated in Justice Ellett' s dissent.
Respectfully submitted,
Frank J. Allen
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
A tto rne y for A ppe Hant
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